), semantic networks (Quillian [4] , Schank [61) , and procedures (Hewitt [1] , Sussman and McDermott [7] ). All these approaches sharemne fundamental concept, the notion of predication. That is, the basic data structure in each system is some representation of a predicate applied to objects. In this respect, the various systems are more or less equivalent. But this basic idea must be extended to handle problems of quantification and knowledge about knowledge. Here the systems do differ. We will argue, though, that these differences result from the descriptive apparatus used in the particu-lar systems being compared, rather than from an inherent advantage of, say, procedures over declaratives or vice versa. Advocates of Planner (e.g., Winograd [8, p. 215] ) have argued that the predicate calculus cannot represent how a piece of knowledge should be used. But this is true only of the first-order predicate calculus. In a higher order or nonordered delcarative language, statements could be made which would tell a theorem prover how other statements are to be used. Planner, on the other hand, has no way of directly stating an existential quantification, but this does not mean that procedural languages are necessarily incapable of handling that problem.
Our belief, then, is that the type of system used to represent knowledge is unimportant, so long as it has sufficient expressive power. This paper presents an attempt at such a system, the language D-Script. As the name implies, the most interesting feature of D-Script is its powerful formalism for descriptions, which enables it to represent statements that are problematical in other systems. No position will be taken as to what kind of language D-Script is. Since it is intended to answer questions by making deductions from a data base, it can be thought of as a theorem prover. Since it operates by comparing expressions like the data-base languages of Planner and Conniver, it can be thought of as a patternmatching language. Since it is Turing universal and, in .fact, includes the lambda calculus, it can be thought of as a programming language.
B. Problems in Representing Knowledge
Before presenting the details of D-Script, we will try to give some idea of the type of problem it is designed to solve. A classic problem is that of representing opaque contexts. An opaque context is one which does not allow substitution of character string (eEg., "FOO," "BLOCK5"). A variable is any alphanumeric character string prefixed by "?" (e.g., "?x"). A form is any sequence of expressions enclosed in angle-brackets (e.g., "(x Y ?z)"). A list is any sequence of expressions enclosed in parentheses (e.g., "(FOO A (BAR B C))").
D-Script observes the convention that all functions, predicates, and operators evaluate their-arguments. The rules for evaluating expressions are largely adapted from Lisp. In fact, D-Script variables and forms are treated just like Lisp atoms and lists, respectively. Rather than introducing "QUOTE," however, we use constants and lists to represent predefined items. The following is a formal statement of our rules.
1) A constant evaluates to itself.
2) A variable evaluates to the expression which it has been assigned.
3) The value of a form is the result of applying its first element to the values of its remaining elements. This will not be defined in general, but only for those expressions which represent meaningful operations in D-Script. One such case is that of lambda-expressions. A lambda-expression is represented in D-Script by a form containing the constant "LAMBDA," followed by a list of variables, followed by an expression (e.g., "(LAMBDA (?x ?Y) (TIMES ?x ?Y))"). A form whose first element is a lambda-expression is evaluated in the same way as a corresponding Lisp expression. The result is the value of the body of the lambda-expression, with the values of the arguments assigned to the corresponding variables. For instance, assuming "+" has the usual meaning, "((LAMBDA (?x) (+ 2 ?x)) 3) " has the same value as " (+ 2 3)," which is "5." We will introduce other types of forms whose value is defined when we explain the representation of statements. It is worth noting that the way lambda-expressions and lists are defined makes it very easy to write functions which construct complex forms. For example, consider "(LAMBDA (?x) (FOO (BAR (GRITCH ?x))))." The result of applying this to "Z" is "(FOO (BAR (GRITCH z)))." A comparable Lisp function would have to be built up with "CONS" 's to achieve this result.
B. Representing Knowledge in D-Script
The most basic statements are those which express simple predication. A To represent more complex statements, two types of extensions are needed. The simpler of these is the addition of logical connectives. D-Script uses "OR," "AND," "NOT," and "IMPLIES" to stand for the obvious logical operations. As in (2.6) 
C. Formal Semantics of D-Script
The previous two sections outlined the syntax and informal semantics of D-Script. This section attempts to show how a program could be written that would interpret D-Script statements in accord with their intuitive meaning. The details of this-will be somewhat sketchy. One reason for this is that choosing proof strategies and using heuristic information are complicated problems that we cannot claim to have solved. Secondly, creating a theorem prover is not our main goal. What we are trying to do is to show the sort of descriptive system necessary to represent the information contained in natural language statements. The purpose of this section is to establish that our notation for that system is "well-founded."
The program we have in mind would take a statement as its input and determine from its data base whether the statement is true. For statements which are simple predications, the program looks for another statement in the data base which matches the first statement. The statement whose truth is being deterfmined will be called the "test statement;" the statement in the data base to which it is being compared will be called the "target statement." To prove a complex statement, the program would break it down into its components and process them according to the semantics of the operators involved. Similarly, a complex target statement 369 must be broken down to its components for processing, but the rules are different. So, in explaining the semantics of complex expressions, analyses will be given for their use both in test statements and in target statements.
Two basic statements match if their corresponding elements match. In general, expressions which are not statements match whenever their values are identical. A variable which has not been assigned a value matches any expression, and is assigned that expression's value. These rules apply to both test statements and target statements. As an example, suppose "5" has been assigned to "?x," "?Y" is unassigned, and "+" has its usual meaning. Then "(FOO 5 ?Y)" will match "(FOO ?x (+ 3 4))" and "7" will be assigned to "?Y".
We will not give a complete deductive procedure for logical connectives. It is a well understood problem and is not of primary importance in the phenomena we wish to explain. But to suggest the kind of procedure we have in mind, consider "AND" and "IMPLIES". In handling these expressions the distinction between test statements and target statements comes through. To prove " (AND x y) " both x and y must be proved; but in matching something against "(AND x y)", the match succeeds if either x or y matches. "(IMPLIES x y)" is true if in a hypothetical state where x is asserted, y can be proved. A test statement will match a target statement "(IMPLIES x y)" if the test statement matches y and x can be proved. "OR" and "NOT" are somewhat more complicated but can be handled in much the same way.
The really important part of our deductive procedure is the treatment of descriptions. Definite descriptions are the simplest. "(THE (?x) (...?x...))" evaluates to the constant which when assigned to "?x" makes "(...?x...)" true. If there is not such a constant or if there is more than one, the value of the description is undefined. For That is, "(FOO (SOME (?x) (BAR ?x)))" matches "(FOO A)" if "(BAR ?x)" is true when "?x" is assigned "A". For the case of a target statement, the evaluation is more difficult. If we know that "Some bar is foo," we could simply give it a name and continue. But giving a name would imply that we know which bar is foo, which is not true. Instead we can create a name and say that if the new name were the name of -the object that is asserted to exist, then anything which we can prove about the new name is true of the object. We do this by creating a hypothetical state of the data base in which, if the new name is "cr999," we assert "(BAR G999)." The target statement then becomes " (FOO G999)." Another way of putting this is that "(SOME (?x) (BAR ?x))" evaluates to "G999," with the side effect of creating a hypothetical state of the data base in which "(BAR G999)" is asserted. When the hypothesis is discharged, the new name becomes undefined, and we are not in danger of supposing that we know what the name of the object is.
The treatment of universal descriptions is the exact dual of that for existential descriptions. In a test statement, we know that whatever we can prove about an arbitrarily selected member of a class is true of every member of the class. So just as we did for existential target statements, we set up a hypothetical state, produce an arbitrary unique name, and assert that it is a member of the class. Analogously to what we said before, "(EVERY (?x) (FOO ?x))I" evaluates to, say, "Glll" with the side effect of creating a hypothetical state in which "(FOO Glll)" is asserted. Also in duality with existential descriptions, in a target statement a universal description matches anything which makes its body true. For example, "(FOO A)" matches "(FOO (EVERY (?x) (BAR ?x)))" if " (BAR ?x)" is true when "?x" is assigned "A". Now we can see why lambda-expressions are important for representing information in D-Script. Evaluating existential and universal descriptions sometimes has the side effect of changing the data base. Later we will introduce other expressions which also do this. If we have other descriptions in the statement, we need to be able to control whether they are evaluated in the old data base or the new. By "lambda-fying" a statement we can bring one or another description to the outside and force it to be evaluated first. In this way we can control the order in which expressions are evaluated. A detailed example of this will be given in Section 111-C.
In this brief summary, we have given the barest outlines of a deductive procedure. We have not discussed any of the complex interactions among these logical op The analysis is analogous for existential descriptions.
The two readings of, and (3.10) means There is a blonde who John wants to marry. (3.12) So the reason we cannot make a "there is ..." paraphrase of (3.9) is that rather than being an existential statement, it is an assertion about an existential statement.
B. Descriptions in Time Contexts
In order to discuss the next set of examples, we need a way to represent time. The basic fact here is that any predicate can be made to vary with time. Even those that we choose to consider eternal can be alleged to depend on time, e.g., Two used to be greater than three.
(3.13)
To account for this in first-order logic, we would have to make time an explicit parameter of every predicate symbol. Instead, we will represent time by a contextstructured data base (McDermott [3] ). By this we mean that the data base will be broken down into a series of sub-data bases, or contexts, each of which represents the state of the world at some particular time. This can be efficiently implemented, as it is in Coniver (Sussman and McDermott [7] ) by specifying each context by recording the differences between it and its predecessor.
To use this kind of data base, we need a special predicate "T-A-T" which takes as its parameters a statement and the name of a time context. "(T-A-T s t)" means statement s is true at time t. The formal semantics of "T-A-T" are that it attempts to deduce s in the time context named by t. We also need to be able to generate references to time contexts. For instance, the phrase when Washington was President would be represented by the description (THE (?T) (T-A-T (PRES WASHINGTON) *?T) ) (3.14) (3.15) Finally we need the one-place predicate "TIME" to make quantified statements about time. We would represent 
1(3.8)
Three is always greater than two. (EVERY (?T) (TIME ?T))) (3.17) Given this notation for time, we can solve the associated problems which we raised earlier. that (3.31) will be used to generate another arbitrary constant (e.g., "G888") in John's world model. We will then try to prove (3.33) from (PHONE-NUM BILL G888) (3.35) Since "G777" does not match "G888," the proof fails.
IV. FUTURE WORK In this paper we have presented a formal language for the representation of knowledge. We have shown how information which is difficult to express in other formalisms can be expressed in our language. And we have suggested how a deductive program could be designed to answer questions in our language. Clearly, the next step in this research is to build that deductive program.
There are several reasons why this would be a worthwhile project. For one, Al deductive systems seem to fall into two extreme categories. On the one hand, predicate-calculus theorem provers restrict themselves to first-order languages. Procedural systems such as Planner, on the other hand, use pattern-matching schemes which are general enough to process higher order statements, but they are so general that they say nothing about the meaning of those statements. Implementing D -Script would create a system somewhere in betweenone that would embody systematic knowledge about some types of higher-order statements.
Beyond this, the particular types of knowledge we have discussed seem to be especially important for Al. There is still much work to be done, but if we can program a deductive system to treat "T-A-T" and "KNOW" in the way we have proposed, we will have taken a first step towards creating programs which can think about thinking.
